

Probabilistic model checking with PRISM: an overview

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What is probabilistic model checking?

- Probabilistic model checking...
 - is a formal verification technique for modelling and analysing systems that exhibit probabilistic behaviour
- Formal verification...
 - is the application of rigorous, mathematics-based techniques to establish the correctness of computerised systems

Why formal verification?

• Errors in computerised systems can be costly...



Pentium chip (1994) Bug found in FPU. Intel (eventually) offers to replace faulty chips. Estimated loss: \$475m



Infusion pumps (2010) Patients die because of incorrect dosage. Cause: software malfunction. 79 recalls.


- Why verify?
- "Testing can only show the presence of errors, not their absence." [Edsger Dijstra]




Toyota Prius (2010) Software "glitch" found in anti-lock braking system. 185,000 cars recalled.



Model checking



Probabilistic model checking



Why probability?

- Some systems are inherently probabilistic...
- Randomisation, e.g. in distributed coordination algorithms
 as a symmetry breaker, in gossip routing to reduce flooding
- Examples: real-world protocols featuring randomisation:
 - Randomised back-off schemes
 - · CSMA protocol, 802.11 Wireless LAN
 - Random choice of waiting time
 - · IEEE1394 Firewire (root contention), Bluetooth (device discovery)
 - Random choice over a set of possible addresses
 - IPv4 Zeroconf dynamic configuration (link-local addressing)
 - Randomised algorithms for anonymity, contract signing, ...

Why probability?

- Some systems are inherently probabilistic...
- Randomisation, e.g. in distributed coordination algorithms
 as a symmetry breaker, in gossip routing to reduce flooding
- To model uncertainty and performance
 - to quantify rate of failures, express Quality of Service
- Examples:
 - computer networks, embedded systems
 - power management policies
 - nano-scale circuitry: reliability through defect-tolerance

Why probability?

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 as a symmetry breaker, in gossip routing to reduce flooding
- To model uncertainty and performance
 - to quantify rate of failures, express Quality of Service
- To model biological processes
 - reactions occurring between large numbers of molecules are naturally modelled in a stochastic fashion

Verifying probabilistic systems

- We are not just interested in correctness
- We want to be able to quantify:
 - security, privacy, trust, anonymity, fairness
 - safety, reliability, performance, dependability
 - resource usage, e.g. battery life
 - and much more...
- Quantitative, as well as qualitative requirements:
 - how reliable is my car's Bluetooth network?
 - how efficient is my phone's power management policy?
 - is my bank's web-service secure?
 - what is the expected long-run percentage of protein X?

Probabilistic models

	Fully probabilistic	Nondeterministic
Discrete time	Discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs)	Markov decision processes (MDPs)
		Simple stochastic games (<mark>SMGs</mark>)
Continuous time	Continuous-time Markov chains (<mark>CTMCs</mark>)	Probabilistic timed automata (PTAs)
		Interactive Markov chains (IMCs)

Probabilistic models


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Overview

- Introduction
- Model checking for discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs)
 - DTMCs: definition, paths & probability spaces
 - PCTL model checking
 - Costs and rewards
 - Case studies: Bluetooth, (CTMC) DNA computing
- PRISM: overview
 - Functionality, GUI, etc
- PRISM: recent developments
 - e.g. multi-objective, parametric, etc
- Summary

Discrete-time Markov chains

- Discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs)
 - state-transition systems augmented with probabilities
- States
 - discrete set of states representing possible configurations of the system being modelled
- Transitions
 - transitions between states occur in discrete time-steps
- Probabilities
 - probability of making transitions between states is given by discrete probability distributions




Discrete-time Markov chains

- Formally, a DTMC D is a tuple (S,s_{init},P,L) where:
 - S is a finite set of states ("state space")
 - $\boldsymbol{s}_{init} \in \boldsymbol{S}$ is the initial state
 - − **P** : S × S → [0,1] is the transition probability matrix where $\Sigma_{s' \in S}$ **P**(s,s') = 1 for all s ∈ S
 - L : S \rightarrow 2^{AP} is function labelling states with atomic propositions

Note: no deadlock states

- i.e. every state has at least one outgoing transition
- can add self loops to represent final/terminating states



Paths and probabilities

- A (finite or infinite) path through a DTMC
 - is a sequence of states $s_0s_1s_2s_3...$ such that $P(s_i,s_{i+1}) > 0 \forall i$
 - represents an execution (i.e. one possible behaviour) of the system which the DTMC is modelling
- To reason (quantitatively) about this system
 - need to define a probability space over paths
- Intuitively:
 - sample space: Path(s) = set of all infinite paths from a state s
 - events: sets of infinite paths from s
 - basic events: cylinder sets (or "cones")
 - cylinder set C(ω), for a finite path ω = set of infinite paths with the common finite prefix ω
 - for example: $C(ss_1s_2)$

Probability space over paths

• Sample space Ω = Path(s)

set of infinite paths with initial state s

- Event set $\Sigma_{Path(s)}$
 - the cylinder set $C(\omega) = \{ \omega' \in Path(s) \mid \omega \text{ is prefix of } \omega' \}$
 - $\Sigma_{Path(s)}$ is the least $\sigma\text{-algebra}$ on Path(s) containing C(w) for all finite paths ω starting in s
- Probability measure Pr_s
 - define probability $P_s(\omega)$ for finite path $\omega = ss_1...s_n$ as:
 - . $\textbf{P}_{s}(\omega)$ = 1 if ω has length one (i.e. ω = s)
 - · $\mathbf{P}_{s}(\omega) = \mathbf{P}(s,s_{1}) \cdot \ldots \cdot \mathbf{P}(s_{n-1},s_{n})$ otherwise
 - · define $Pr_s(C(\omega)) = P_s(\omega)$ for all finite paths · ω
 - Pr_s extends uniquely to a probability measure $Pr_s: \Sigma_{Path(s)} \rightarrow [0,1]$
- See [KSK76] for further details

Probability space – Example


• Paths where sending fails the first time

$$-\omega = s_0 s_1 s_2$$

 $- C(\omega) = all paths starting s_0 s_1 s_2 \dots$

$$- \mathbf{P}_{s0}(\omega) = \mathbf{P}(s_0, s_1) \cdot \mathbf{P}(s_1, s_2) \\= 1 \cdot 0.01 = 0.01$$

$$- Pr_{s0}(C(\omega)) = P_{s0}(\omega) = 0.01$$



Paths which are eventually successful and with no failures

$$- C(s_0s_1s_3) \cup C(s_0s_1s_1s_3) \cup C(s_0s_1s_1s_1s_3) \cup \dots$$

- $Pr_{s0}(C(s_0s_1s_3) \cup C(s_0s_1s_1s_3) \cup C(s_0s_1s_1s_1s_3) \cup \dots)$
= $P_{s0}(s_0s_1s_3) + P_{s0}(s_0s_1s_1s_3) + P_{s0}(s_0s_1s_1s_1s_3) + \dots$
= $1 \cdot 0.98 + 1 \cdot 0.01 \cdot 0.98 + 1 \cdot 0.01 \cdot 0.01 \cdot 0.98 + \dots$
= $0.9898989898.\dots$
= $98/99$

PCTL


- Temporal logic for describing properties of DTMCs
 - PCTL = Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic [HJ94]
 - essentially the same as the logic pCTL of [ASB+95]
- Extension of (non-probabilistic) temporal logic CTL
 - key addition is probabilistic operator P
 - quantitative extension of CTL's A and E operators

• Example

- − send → $P_{\geq 0.95}$ [true U^{≤10} deliver]
- "if a message is sent, then the probability of it being delivered within 10 steps is at least 0.95"




PCTL syntax



- define F φ = true U φ (eventually), G φ = \neg (F $\neg\varphi)$ (globally)
- where a is an atomic proposition, used to identify states of interest, $p \in [0,1]$ is a probability, $\sim \in \{<,>,\leq,\geq\}$, $k \in \mathbb{N}$
- A PCTL formula is always a state formula
 - path formulas only occur inside the P operator

PCTL semantics for DTMCs

- PCTL formulas interpreted over states of a DTMC
 - $s \models \varphi$ denotes φ is "true in state s" or "satisfied in state s"
- Semantics of (non-probabilistic) state formulas:
 - for a state s of the DTMC (S, s_{init} , P,L):
 - $s \vDash a \iff a \in L(s)$
 - $s \vDash \varphi_1 \land \varphi_2 \qquad \Leftrightarrow \ s \vDash \varphi_1 \text{ and } s \vDash \varphi_2$
 - $s \models \neg \varphi \qquad \Leftrightarrow s \models \varphi \text{ is false}$
- Examples
 - $s_3 \models succ$
 - $s_1 \models try \land \neg fail$



PCTL semantics for DTMCs


- Semantics of path formulas:
 - for a path $\omega = s_0 s_1 s_2 \dots$ in the DTMC:

$$- \omega \models X \varphi \qquad \Leftrightarrow s_1 \models \varphi$$

- $\ \omega \vDash \varphi_1 \ U^{\leq k} \ \varphi_2 \quad \Leftrightarrow \ \exists i \leq k \ \text{such that} \ s_i \vDash \varphi_2 \ \text{and} \ \forall j < i \text{,} \ s_j \vDash \varphi_1$
- $\omega \vDash \varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2 \qquad \Leftrightarrow \ \exists k \ge 0 \text{ such that } \omega \vDash \varphi_1 \cup^{\leq k} \varphi_2$
- Some examples of satisfying paths:
 - X succ {try} {succ} {succ} {succ} $s_1 \rightarrow s_3 \rightarrow s_3$


 $- \neg$ fail U succ

{try} {try} {succ} {succ}




PCTL semantics for DTMCs

- Semantics of the probabilistic operator P
 - informal definition: $s \models P_{-p} [\psi]$ means that "the probability, from state s, that ψ is true for an outgoing path satisfies $\sim p$ "
 - example: $s \models P_{<0.25}$ [X fail] \Leftrightarrow "the probability of atomic proposition fail being true in the next state of outgoing paths from s is less than 0.25"
 - formally: $s \models P_{\sim p} [\psi] \Leftrightarrow Prob(s, \psi) \sim p$
 - where: Prob(s, ψ) = Pr_s { $\omega \in Path(s) \mid \omega \vDash \psi$ }
 - (sets of paths satisfying ψ are always measurable [Var85])



Quantitative properties

- Consider a PCTL formula P_{-p} [ψ]
 - if the probability is unknown, how to choose the bound p?
- When the outermost operator of a PTCL formula is P
 - we allow the form $P_{=?}$ [ψ]
 - "what is the probability that path formula $\boldsymbol{\psi}$ is true?"
- Model checking is no harder: compute the values anyway
- Useful to spot patterns, trends
- Example
 - $P_{=?}$ [F err/total>0.1]
 - "what is the probability that 10% of the NAND gate outputs are erroneous?"




PCTL model checking for DTMCs

- Algorithm for PCTL model checking [CY88,HJ94,CY95]
 - inputs: DTMC D=(S,s_{init},P,L), PCTL formula ϕ
 - output: Sat(ϕ) = { s \in S | s $\models \phi$ } = set of states satisfying ϕ
- What does it mean for a DTMC D to satisfy a formula $\varphi?$
 - sometimes, want to check that $s \vDash \varphi \forall s \in S$, i.e. $Sat(\varphi) = S$
 - sometimes, just want to know if $s_{init} \models \phi$, i.e. if $s_{init} \in Sat(\phi)$
- Sometimes, focus on quantitative results
 - e.g. compute result of P=? [F error]
 - e.g. compute result of P=? [$F^{\leq k}$ error] for $0 \leq k \leq 100$

PCTL model checking for DTMCs

- Basic algorithm proceeds by induction on parse tree of ϕ - example: $\phi = (\neg fail \land try) \rightarrow P_{>0.95} [\neg fail U succ]$
- For the non-probabilistic operators:
 - Sat(true) = S
 - $\ Sat(a) = \{ \ s \in S \ | \ a \in L(s) \ \}$
 - $\ Sat(\neg \varphi) = S \ \setminus \ Sat(\varphi)$
 - $\ Sat(\varphi_1 \ \land \ \varphi_2) = Sat(\varphi_1) \ \cap \ Sat(\varphi_2)$
- For the $P_{\sim p}$ [ψ] operator
 - need to compute the probabilities $Prob(s, \psi)$ for all states $s \in S$
 - focus here on "until" case: $\psi = \phi_1 U \phi_2$



PCTL until for DTMCs

- + Computation of probabilities Prob(s, φ_1 U $\varphi_2)$ for all s \in S
- First, identify all states where the probability is 1 or 0
 - $\hspace{0.1 cm} S^{yes} \hspace{0.1 cm} = \hspace{0.1 cm} Sat(P_{\geq 1} \hspace{0.1 cm} [\hspace{0.1 cm} \varphi_{1} \hspace{0.1 cm} U \hspace{0.1 cm} \varphi_{2} \hspace{0.1 cm}])$
 - $\ S^{no} = Sat(P_{\leq 0} \ [\ \varphi_1 \ U \ \varphi_2 \])$
- Then solve linear equation system for remaining states
- We refer to the first phase as "precomputation"
 - two algorithms: Prob0 (for S^{no}) and Prob1 (for S^{yes})
 - algorithms work on underlying graph (probabilities irrelevant)
- Important for several reasons
 - reduces the set of states for which probabilities must be computed numerically (which is more expensive)
 - gives exact results for the states in S^{yes} and S^{no} (no round-off)
 - for $P_{-p}[\cdot]$ where p is 0 or 1, no further computation required

PCTL until - Linear equations

• Probabilities Prob(s, $\phi_1 \cup \phi_2$) can now be obtained as the unique solution of the following set of linear equations:

$$Prob(s, \phi_1 \cup \phi_2) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } s \in S^{yes} \\ 0 & \text{if } s \in S^{no} \\ \sum_{s' \in S} P(s,s') \cdot Prob(s', \phi_1 \cup \phi_2) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


- can be reduced to a system in $|S^{?}|$ unknowns instead of |S| where $S^{?}$ = S \setminus (S^{yes} \cup S^no)

• This can be solved with (a variety of) standard techniques

- direct methods, e.g. Gaussian elimination
- iterative methods, e.g. Jacobi, Gauss-Seidel, ...
 (preferred in practice due to scalability)


PCTL until – Example

• Example: $P_{>0.8}$ [¬a U b]



PCTL until – Example

• Example: $P_{>0.8}$ [$\neg a \cup b$]



PCTL until – Example

0.6

0.4 0.1

0.9

a

0.1

- Example: $P_{>0.8}$ [$\neg a \cup b$]
- Let $x_s = Prob(s, \neg a \cup b)$
- Solve:
- $x_4 = x_5 = 1$ $x_1 = x_3 = 0$

0.1 $x_0 = 0.1x_1 + 0.9x_2 = 0.8$ $x_2 = 0.1x_2 + 0.1x_3 + 0.3x_5 + 0.5x_4 = 8/9$ <u>Prob</u>(\neg a U b) = <u>x</u> = [0.8, 0, 8/9, 0, 1, 1]

Sat($P_{>0.8}$ [$\neg a \cup b$]) = { s_2, s_4, s_5 }

 $S^{no} =$

Sat(P_{<0} [¬a U b])

··**O**: 3

0 1

0.3

Syes = 0.7 Sat(P_{≥1} [¬a U b])

PCTL model checking – Summary

- Computation of set Sat(Φ) for DTMC D and PCTL formula Φ
 - recursive descent of parse tree
 - combination of graph algorithms, numerical computation

• Probabilistic operator P:

- X Φ : one matrix-vector multiplication, O(|S|²)
- $\Phi_1 U^{\leq k} \Phi_2$: k matrix-vector multiplications, $O(k|S|^2)$
- $\Phi_1 \cup \Phi_2$: linear equation system, at most |S| variables, O(|S|³)

Complexity:

- linear in $|\Phi|$ and polynomial in |S|

Limitations of PCTL

- PCTL, although useful in practice, has limited expressivity
 - essentially: probability of reaching states in X, passing only through states in Y (and within k time-steps)
- More expressive logics can be used, for example:
 - LTL [Pnu77] (non-probabilistic) linear-time temporal logic
 - PCTL* [ASB+95,BdA95] which subsumes both PCTL and LTL
 - both allow path operators to be combined
 - (in PCTL, P_{-p} [...] always contains a single temporal operator)
 - supported by PRISM
 - (not covered in this lecture)
- Another direction: extend DTMCs with costs and rewards...

Costs and rewards

- We augment DTMCs with rewards (or, conversely, costs)
 - real-valued quantities assigned to states and/or transitions
 - these can have a wide range of possible interpretations

• Some examples:

 elapsed time, power consumption, size of message queue, number of messages successfully delivered, net profit, ...

Costs? or rewards?

- mathematically, no distinction between rewards and costs
- when interpreted, we assume that it is desirable to minimise costs and to maximise rewards
- we will consistently use the terminology "rewards" regardless

Reward-based properties


- Properties of DTMCs augmented with rewards
 - allow a wide range of quantitative measures of the system
 - basic notion: expected value of rewards
 - formal property specifications will be in an extension of PCTL
- More precisely, we use two distinct classes of property...
- Instantaneous properties
 - the expected value of the reward at some time point
- Cumulative properties
 - the expected cumulated reward over some period

DTMC reward structures

- For a DTMC (S,s_{init},P,L), a reward structure is a pair (ρ , ι)
 - $\underline{\rho} : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ is the state reward function (vector)
 - $-\iota: S \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ is the transition reward function (matrix)
- Example (for use with instantaneous properties)
 - "size of message queue": $\underline{\rho}$ maps each state to the number of jobs in the queue in that state, ι is not used
- Examples (for use with cumulative properties)
 - "time-steps": $\underline{\rho}$ returns 1 for all states and ι is zero (equivalently, $\underline{\rho}$ is zero and ι returns 1 for all transitions)
 - "number of messages lost": <u>ρ</u> is zero and ι maps transitions corresponding to a message loss to 1
 - "power consumption": <u>ρ</u> is defined as the per-time-step energy consumption in each state and ι as the energy cost of each transition

PCTL and rewards

- Extend PCTL to incorporate reward-based properties
 - add an R operator, which is similar to the existing P operator



- where $r \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$, ~ $\thicksim \in \{<,>,\leq,\geq\}$, $k \in \mathbb{N}$
- R_{r} [] means "the expected value of satisfies r"

Reward formula semantics

- Formal semantics of the three reward operators
 - based on random variables over (infinite) paths
- Recall:

$$- s \models P_{\sim p} [\psi] \iff Pr_s \{ \omega \in Path(s) \mid \omega \models \psi \} \sim p$$

• For a state s in the DTMC (see [KNP07a] for full definition):

$$- s \models R_{-r} [I^{=k}] \iff Exp(s, X_{I=k}) \sim r$$

$$- s \models R_{\sim r} [C^{\leq k}] \iff Exp(s, X_{C \leq k}) \sim r$$

 $- s \models R_{\sim r} [F \Phi] \Leftrightarrow Exp(s, X_{F\Phi}) \sim r$

where: Exp(s, X) denotes the expectation of the random variable X : Path(s) $\rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ with respect to the probability measure Pr_s

Model checking reward properties

- Instantaneous: R_{-r} [$I^{=k}$]
- Cumulative: $R_{-r} [C^{\leq k}]$
 - variant of the method for computing bounded until probabilities
 - solution of recursive equations
- Reachability: R_{r} [F ϕ]
 - similar to computing until probabilities
 - precomputation phase (identify infinite reward states)
 - then reduces to solving a system of linear equation
- For more details, see e.g. [KNP07a]
 - complexity not increased wrt classical PCTL

PCTL model checking summary...

- Introduced probabilistic model checking for DTMCs
 - discrete time and probability only
 - PCTL model checking via linear equation solving
 - LTL also supported, via automata-theoretic methods
- Continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs)
 - discrete states, continuous time
 - temporal logic CSL
 - model checking via uniformisation, a discretisation of the CTMC
- Markov decision processes (MDPs)
 - add nondeterminism to DTMCs
 - PCTL, LTL and PCTL* supported
 - model checking via linear programming

PRISM

- PRISM: Probabilistic symbolic model checker
 - developed at Birmingham/Oxford University, since 1999
 - free, open source software (GPL), runs on all major OSs
- Construction/analysis of probabilistic models...
 - discrete-time Markov chains, continuous-time Markov chains, Markov decision processes, probabilistic timed automata, stochastic multi-player games, ...
- Simple but flexible high-level modelling language
 - based on guarded commands; see later...
- Many import/export options, tool connections
 - in: (Bio)PEPA, stochastic π -calculus, DSD, SBML, Petri nets, ...
 - out: Matlab, MRMC, INFAMY, PARAM, ...

PRISM...

- Model checking for various temporal logics...
 - PCTL, CSL, LTL, PCTL*, rPATL, CTL, ...
 - quantitative extensions, costs/rewards, ...
- Various efficient model checking engines and techniques
 - symbolic methods (binary decision diagrams and extensions)
 - explicit-state methods (sparse matrices, etc.)
 - statistical model checking (simulation-based approximations)
 - and more: symmetry reduction, quantitative abstraction refinement, fast adaptive uniformisation, ...
- Graphical user interface
 - editors, simulator, experiments, graph plotting
- See: <u>http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/</u>
 - downloads, tutorials, case studies, papers, ...

PRISM GUI: Editing a model

R

$\mathbf{\Theta}$ $\mathbf{\Theta}$	PRISM 4.1
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 Model: power_policy1.sm Type: CTMC Modules G SQ G max: q_max init: 0 max: q_max init: 0 max: 2 init: 0 max: 2 init: 0 PM Constants Q_max : int Tate_arrive : double Tate_szi : double Tate_izs : int 	<pre>9 9 // 10 11 11 // Service Queue (50) 12 // Stores requests which arrive into the system to be processed. 13 14 // Maximum queue size 15 const int q_max = 20; 16 17 // Request arrival rate 18 const double rate_arrive = 1/0.72; // (mean inter-arrival time is 0.72 seconds) 19 10 20 21 22 23 24 25 25 25 26 26 27 27 27 28 28 29 29 29 29 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20</pre>
Built Model States: 42 Initial states: 1	<pre>39 40 // Rate of service (average service time = 0.008s) 41 const double rate_serve = 1/0.008; 42 // Rate of switching from sleep to idle (average transition time = 1.6s) 43 const double rate_s2i = 1/1.6; 44 // Rate of switching from idle to sleep (average transition time = 0.67s) 45 const double rate i2s = 1/0.67;</pre>

PRISM GUI: The Simulator

6	matic exploratio	n	Manua	explora	tion						State la	abels Pa	ath formul	ae Path	n informati	on	
	Simulate			/odule/	[action]	Ra	te	Up	date		💥 init						
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Step	os 🔻 1		Rig	ht		0.002		right_n'=()		🗹 min						
lackt	racking		Line	2		2.0E-4		line_n'=fa			🗙 pre	mium					
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Step	os 🔻 1						₽ G	enerate time	automati	cally							
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ath																	
	Step		Time		.eft	Ri	ght	Repair	Li	ne	То	Left	ToR	light		Rewards	
	Action	#	Time (+)	left_n	left	right_n	right	r	line	line_n	toleft	toleft_n	toright	toright_n	"perce	"time	["num.
		0	0	Ś	false) (\$	(false)	(false)	(false)	(true)	(false)	(true)	(false)	(true)	100	Ó	Ó
	Right	1	12.0649			4									90		
	ToRight	2	12.0806											(false)			
	[startRight]	3	12.1674				(true)	true									0
	[repairRight]	4	12.2677			\$	(false)	(false)							100		(D)
	Left	5	12.2809	4 3											99-89 79-69-		
	Left	6	12.3071	3											80		
	Left	7	12.3446	¢											(70)	Φ	
	Left	8	12.3653	Φ											60		
	Right	9	12.4059			4									50		
	[startLeft]	10	12.4583		(true)			(true)									<u> </u>
	[repairLeft]	11	15.6657	¢	false			(false)							60		Q
		12	15.6834		(true)			(true)									
	[startLeft]	13	15.7585	3	false			(false)							(70) (60)	<u> </u>	φ
	[repairLeft]		15.8505			3									60		
	[repairLeft] Right	14				6											
	[repairLeft]	14 15 16	15.874		false	3 2 1	(false)	(false)	(false)	(true)	(false)	(true)	(false)	(false)	50 40		2

PRISM GUI: Model checking and graphs

Properties list: /Users/dxp/prism-www	w/tutorial/examples	/power/power.csl*						
Properties				xperiments				
P=? [F[T,T] q=q_max]								
S=? [q=q_max]			I	Property	Defined Const	Progress	Status	Method
√x R=? [I=T]			8 F	=? [I=T]	T=0:1:40	41/41 (100%)	Done	Verification
√x R=? [S]				=? [I=T]	q_trigger=3:3	246/246 (100%	Done	Verification
✓ R<1.5 [I=T]				=?[I=T]	q_trigger=5,T	41/41 (100%)	Done	Verification
🗙 R<2 [S]				=?[I=T]	q_trigger=5,T	41/41 (100%)	Done	Verification
				=?[S]	q_trigger=2:1	29/29 (100%)	Done	Verification
				=?[S]	q_trigger=2:1	49/99 <mark>(49%)</mark>	Stopped	Verification
What is the long-run expected size o	f the queue? Type	Value		Graph 1 G	raph 2	d queue size	at time T	
Constants		Value		Graph 1 G		d queue size	at time T	
Constants		Value		12.5		d queue size	at time T	
- Constants Name T int		Value		12.5		d queue size	at time T	← q_trigger ← q_trigger
Constants Name T int Labels				12.5		d queue size	at time T	q_trigger
- Constants Name T int		Value Definition		12.5		d queue size	at time T	q_trigger q_trigger q_trigger
Constants Name T int Labels				12.5 10.0 7.5 5.0		d queue size	at time T	q_trigger q_trigger q_trigger q_trigger
Constants Name T int Labels				12.5		d queue size	at time T	q_trigger q_trigger q_trigger q_trigger
Constants Name T int Labels				12.5 10.0 7.5 5.0		d queue size	at time T	
Constants Name T int Labels				12.5 - 10.0 - 7.5 - 5.0 - 2.5 -	Expected	d queue size		q_trigger q_trigger q_trigger q_trigger

PRISM - Case studies


- Randomised distributed algorithms
 - consensus, leader election, self-stabilisation, ...
 - Randomised communication protocols
 - Bluetooth, FireWire, Zeroconf, 802.11, Zigbee, gossiping, ...
- Security protocols/systems
 - contract signing, anonymity, pin cracking, quantum crypto, ...
 - **Biological systems**
 - cell signalling pathways, DNA computation, ...
- Planning & controller synthesis
 - robotics, dynamic power management, ...
- Performance & reliability
 - nanotechnology, cloud computing, manufacturing systems, ...
- See: <u>www.prismmodelchecker.org/casestudies</u>


Case study: Bluetooth

- Device discovery between pair of Bluetooth devices
 - performance essential for this phase
- Complex discovery process
 - two asynchronous 28-bit clocks
 - pseudo-random hopping between 32 frequencies
 - random waiting scheme to avoid collisions
 - 17,179,869,184 initial configurations (too many to sample effectively)

Probabilistic model checking


- e.g. "worst-case expected discovery time is at most 5.17s"
- e.g. "probability discovery time exceeds 6s is always < 0.001"
- shows weaknesses in simplistic analysis





Case study: DNA programming

- DNA: easily accessible, cheap to synthesise information processing material
- DNA Strand Displacement language, induces CTMC models
 - for designing DNA circuits [Cardelli, Phillips, et al.]
 - accompanying software tool for analysis/simulation
 - now extended to include auto-generation of PRISM models
- Transducer: converts input <t^ x> into output <y t^>



- Formalising correctness: does it finish successfully?...
 - A [G "deadlock" => "all_done"]
 - E [F "all_done"] (CTL, but probabilistic also...)

Transducer flaw

____ (1)

_____ (1)

_____ (1)

t c.2 a (1)

t x² (1)

 $x_{0} \pm (1)$

 $x_1 c.1 t_{(1)}$

x1 c.1 t

x1 t c.2 a t a $x1^*$ t^{*} c.2^{*} a^{*} t^{*} a^{*}

 $\frac{x^{2} c.2 t}{t^{*} x^{2} c.2^{*} t^{*} a^{*} t^{*}} (1)$

(1)

____ (1)

(1)

- PRISM identifies a 5-step trace to the "bad" deadlock state
 - problem caused by "crosstalk" (interference) between DSD species from the two copies of the gates
 - previously found manually [Cardelli'10]
 - detection now fully automated
 - Bug is easily fixed

reactive gates

– (and verified)

Counterexample:

PRISM: Recent & new developments

- Major new features:
 - 1. multi-objective model checking
 - 2. parametric model checking
 - 3. real-time: probabilistic timed automata (PTAs)
 - 4. games: stochastic multi-player games (SMGs)
- Further new additions:
 - strategy (adversary) synthesis (see ATVA'13 invited lecture)
 - CTL model checking & counterexample generation
 - enhanced statistical model checking (approximations + confidence intervals, acceptance sampling)
 - efficient CTMC model checking (fast adaptive uniformisation) [Mateescu et al., CMSB'13]
 - benchmark suite & testing functionality [QEST'12] <u>www.prismmodelchecker.org/benchmarks/</u>

1. Multi-objective model checking

- Markov decision processes (MDPs)
 - generalise DTMCs by adding nondeterminism
 - for: control, concurrency, abstraction, ...
- Strategies (or "adversaries", "policies")
 - resolve nondeterminism, i.e. choose an action in each state based on current history
 - a strategy induces an (infinite-state) DTMC
- Verification (probabilistic model checking) of MDPs
 - quantify over all possible strategies... (i.e. best/worst-case)
 - $P_{<0.01}$ [F err]: "the probability of an error is <u>always</u> < 0.01"
- Strategy synthesis (dual problem)
 - "does there exist a strategy for which the probability of an error occurring is < 0.01?"
 - "how to minimise expected run-time?"

{heads}

{tails}

0.5

S₁


{init} a 1

0.7 b

0.3

1. Multi-objective model checking

- Multi-objective probabilistic model checking
 - investigate trade-offs between conflicting objectives
 - in PRISM, objectives are probabilistic LTL or expected rewards
- Achievability queries
 - e.g. "is there a strategy such that the probability of message transmission is > 0.95 and expected battery life > 10 hrs?"
 - multi($P_{>0.95}$ [F transmit], $R^{time}_{>10}$ [C])
- Numerical queries
 - e.g. "maximum probability of message transmission, assuming expected battery life-time is > 10 hrs?"
 - multi($P_{max=?}$ [F transmit], $R^{time}_{>10}$ [C])
- Pareto queries
 - e.g. "Pareto curve for maximising probability of transmission and expected battery life-time"
 - multi(P_{max=?} [F transmit], R^{time}_{max=?} [C])




Case study: Dynamic power management

- Synthesis of dynamic power management schemes
 - for an IBM TravelStar VP disk drive
 - 5 different power modes: active, idle, idlelp, stby, sleep
 - power manager controller bases decisions on current power mode, disk request queue, etc.

Build controllers that

- minimise energy consumption, subject to constraints on e.g.
- probability that a request waits more than K steps
- expected number of lost disk requests



See: <u>http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/files/tacas11/</u>

Conclusion

- Introduction to probabilistic model checking
- Overview of PRISM
- More models and logics
 - continuous-time Markov chains
 - Markov decision processes
 - probabilistic timed automata
 - stochastic multi-player games
 - Related/future work
 - quantitative runtime verification [TSE'11,CACM'12]
 - statistical model checking [TACAS'04,STTT'06]
 - multi-objective stochastic games [MFCS'13,QEST'13]
 - verification of cardiac pacemakers [RTSS'12, HSCC'13]
 - probabilistic hybrid automata [CPSWeek'13 tutorial]

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PRISM tool paper

M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman and D. Parker. *PRISM 4.0: Verification of Probabilistic Real-time Systems*. In Proc. CAV'11, volume 6806 of LNCS, pages 585–591, Springer. July 2011.

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 - VERWARE <u>www.veriware.org</u>
 - PRISM www.prismmodelchecker.org